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European Central Bank working paper series 37Abstract
This paper examines monetary policy implementation in a
sticky price model. The central bank’s plan under discre-
tionary optimization is entirely forward-looking and exhibits
multiple equilibrium solutions if transactions frictions are
not negligibly small. The central bank can then implement
stable history dependent equilibrium sequences that are con-
sistent with its plan by inertial interest rate adjustments or
by money injections. These equilibria are associated with
lower welfare losses than a forward-looking solution imple-
mented by interest rate adjustments. The welfare gain from
a history dependent implementation is found to rise with
the strength of transactions frictions and the degree of price
ﬂexibility. It is further shown that the central bank’s plan
can uniquely be implemented in a history dependent way by
money injections, whereas inertial interest rate adjustments
cannot avoid equilibrium multiplicity.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E51, E32.
Keywords: Monetary policy implementation, optimal dis-
cretionary policy, history dependence, equilibrium indeter-
minacy, money growth policy.
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A central bank can aﬀect the private sector behavior by adjusting its instruments to
changes in the current state of the economy, given that there exists some source of mon-
etary non-neutrality, e.g., rigid prices. If it is able to credibly commit itself to future
actions it can further alter expectations of a forward-looking private sector by policy an-
nouncement. Most real world central banks can however at best be characterized by a
discretionary conduct of monetary policy. In order to stabilize prices and real activity,
they can therefore not strategically manipulate expectations. Hence, they rely on vigor-
ous state contingent adjustments of the prevailing policy instrument for macroeconomic
stabilization.
In an environment where markets do not work frictionless and changes in nominal
interest rates are associated with non-negligible costs, central banks should abstain from
aggressive interest rate adjustments. Thus, there might exist a trade-oﬀ between the
stabilization of prices and real activity, on the one hand, and of the nominal interest rate,
on the other hand. This trade-oﬀ can lead to a less successful macroeconomic stabilization,
especially, when a central bank acts in a discretionary way. This ineﬃciency is particularly
harmful if such a policy is too accommodative to pin down expectations and the allocation.
As a consequence, a discretionary monetary policy — though it is aimed to maximize social
welfare — might allow for welfare-reducing macroeconomic ﬂuctuations induced by self-
fulﬁlling expectations. Yet, even if ﬂuctuations would not arise endogenously, the problem
remains that monetary policy fails to select exactly one of multiple feasible equilibria.
It is shown in this paper that a central bank can — under the circumstances described
a b o v e—i m p l e m e n td i ﬀerent equilibria, which are consistent with a particular plan under
discretionary optimization, by applying diﬀerent operational procedures. We consider the
cases where the central bank either sets the nominal interest rate in a forward-looking
way or in an inertial way, or uses money injections. Since the central bank acts under
discretion, it does not account for its impact on private sector expectations such that its
plan does not exhibit any backward-looking element. However, monetary policy can be
de facto history dependent if the central bank implements its plan by inertial interest rate
adjustments or by money injections, i.e., by changes in the growth rate of the outstanding
stock of money.
Due to a link to past conditions, monetary policy implementation can alter the way pri-
vate sector expectations are built and can thereby aﬀect macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. As
responses to aggregate shocks are smoothed out, a history dependent policy implementa-
tion can reduce welfare losses compared to an entirely forward-looking conduct of monetary
policy. This welfare gain is found to increase with the severity of transactions frictions
and with the persistence of aggregate shocks. Yet, the problem of equilibrium selection is
not automatically resolved by a backward-looking policy implementation. Speciﬁcally, the
central bank can only implement a history dependent equilibrium in a unique way if it uses
5
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relevant for central bank operations and for the allocation, and thereby serves as an equi-
librium selection criterion. If, on the contrary, transactions frictions are negligibly small
compared to distortions induced by price rigidities, the problem of equilibrium multiplicity
vanishes and the interest rate should be applied as the monetary policy instrument.
On the one hand, this paper provides novel results regarding the problem of the mon-
etary instrument choice based on welfare and determinacy properties under discretionary
policy. On the other hand, it unveils a deﬁciency in many recent contributions to macro-
economic analysis of monetary policy. Studies on optimal monetary policy usually apply
stylized models where the issue of policy implementation is not explicitly considered.
While some real world central banks might be able to change interest rate targets by
mere announcements, the majority of central banks still implements operating targets by
quantity adjustments in open market operations. When monetary policy is solely char-
acterized by state contingent adjustments of the nominal interest rate, the ineﬃciency of
discretionary policy with regard to macroeconomic stabilization and the alleged problem
of equilibrium multiplicity are likely to be over-emphasized. The analysis in this paper
has shown that both problems are in fact less severe if the history dependence of monetary
policy implementation, in particular, of money supply adjustments, is taken into account.
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Does it matter how a particular plan of a central bank is implemented? In general, discre-
tionary policy leads to suboptimal outcomes, while an optimal commitment policy, which
implements a superior allocation, is not time consistent (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977).3
Discretionary policies are further known to allow for the possibility of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium multiplicity (see Albanesi et al., 2003, and King and Wolman, 2004).4
Both, ineﬃciency and indeterminacy are due to the characteristic feature of discretionary
policymaking not to account for private sector expectations about policy actions, and to
the lack of history dependence when the private sector is forward-looking (see Woodford,
2003a, 2003b). In this paper, we show that a plan of a central bank acting under discretion
can be implemented in a history dependent way, even when the private sector is entirely
forward-looking. The conduct of monetary policy depends on past conditions when the
central bank applies either the interest rate in an inertial way or the money growth rate
as its instrument. The induced history dependence is able to raise household welfare com-
pared to the case where the central bank implements its plan by purely forward-looking
interest rate adjustments. In order to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy the central bank
should control the growth rate of nominal money balances.
Previous studies on the monetary instrument choice have mainly focussed on the sta-
bilization and welfare implications of particular rules for diﬀerent instruments, such as
Poole (1970), Sargent and Wallace (1975), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Collard and Del-
las (2004), or Gavin et al. (2004). In contrast to these studies, we examine diﬀerent
reaction functions for monetary policy instruments under a particular plan of an optimiz-
ing central bank. Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to the realistic case
where the central bank cannot commit itself to a once-and-for-all-policy, and acts in a
discretionary way. We consider a framework with conﬂicting macroeconomic distortions,
implying that the central bank faces a trade-oﬀ, since it cannot eliminate more than one
friction with a single instrument. The central bank’s optimal plan under discretion can
then exhibit multiple equilibrium solutions. This has also been shown in several recent
studies on monetary discretion in New Keynesian models, where distortions induced by
price rigidities are accompanied by distortions due to monopolistic competition (see King
and Wolman, 2004, and Siu 2005) or transactions frictions (see Albanesi et al., 2003,
Brueckner and Schabert, 2005, and Kurozumi, 2005). Once a particular plan is consistent
with more than one allocation and equilibrium price system, the operational procedure of
monetary policy and the instrument choice can matter.
The novel idea of this paper is that diﬀerent instruments, which are designed to im-
3Exceptions of the latter principle are examined in Alvarez et al. (2004). In particular, they show that
commitment policies can be time consistent when the Friedman rule is optimal.
4The existence of multiple equilibria under discretionary monetary policy is further examined in Brueck-
ner and Schabert (2005), Kurozumi (2005), and Siu (2005).
7
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 533
October 2005plement such a (not uniquely determined) plan of the central bank, can lead to unequal
macroeconomic outcomes and therefore to diﬀerent results regarding equilibrium deter-
minacy and social welfare. Speciﬁcally, we consider three means of monetary policy im-
plementation: i.) a forward-looking and ii.) an inertial reaction function for the risk-free
nominal interest rate, as well as iii.) a forward-looking reaction function for monetary
injections. If the plan is implemented by i.), the conduct of monetary policy by a central
bank that acts in a discretionary way is entirely forward-looking. However, when the
monetary instrument is set in a history dependent way, such as under an inertial interest
rate reaction function, monetary policy becomes history dependent. The same result holds
for the case iii.), where the central bank adjusts the money stock in a forward-looking
way in order to implement its plan. The reason is that a central bank operation that is
meant to adjust the supply of money has to take into account the (predetermined) stock
of outstanding money.5 Put diﬀerently, the beginning-of-period stock of money contains
non-negligible information for a contingent money injection required to obtain a particu-
lar end-of-period stock of money. Thus, when money supply, i.e., the money growth rate,
serves as the instrument monetary policy becomes history dependent, even if the central
bank does — in contrast to ii.) — not consider past conditions as indicators for adjustments
of its instruments.
We apply a standard New Keynesian framework with transactions frictions (modelled
by money-in-the-utility-function) and with cost-push shocks. The central bank’s plan un-
der discretionary optimization is shown to allow for equilibrium multiplicity. Since interest
rate changes are associated with non-negligible welfare costs, the central bank abstains
from choosing a plan that is associated with strong (active) adjustments of the interest
rate, which would lead to equilibrium uniqueness (since the Taylor-principle applies in
our model). The likelihood of equilibrium multiplicity under discretionary policy thereby
increases with the severity of transactions frictions.6 However, the central bank can avoid
equilibrium indeterminacy by designing a reaction function for the prevailing instrument
in an appropriate way. For example, there exist interest rate reaction functions of type i.)
that uniquely implement an entirely forward-looking solution to the central bank’s plan.
There further exists a money supply reaction function that uniquely implements a history
dependent and stable solution to the plan. In contrast, it is shown that a reaction func-
tion of type ii.) cannot implement a history dependent solution of the plan in a stable
and unique way. Thus, under an inertial interest rate reaction function the problem of
equilibrium indeterminacy cannot be avoided, implying that monetary policy allows for
non-fundamental equilibria and thus endogenous ﬂuctuations.
5Related studies on the equilibrium behavior of sticky price models have also shown that real money
serves as a relevant endogenous state variable when the central bank controls the money growth rate (see
e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2003, and Schabert, 2005).
6In the limiting case, where the distortion due to transactions frictions is negligible, the central bank’s
plan under discretionary exhibits a unique solution (see Jensen, 2002).
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consistent with the central bank’s plan, we compare the welfare implications of diﬀer-
ent means of monetary policy implementation.7 As stressed by Woodford (2003a), history
dependence can be beneﬁcial for social welfare when the private sector behavior is forward-
looking. Based on this principle, Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003b) have shown that
social welfare can be raised under a discretionary monetary policy by introducing lagged
endogenous variables in the central banker’s objective, inducing the plan under discre-
tionary optimization to be history dependent. Corresponding to these results, we ﬁnd
that equilibria under a history dependent implementation of monetary policy, i.e., under
ii.) and iii.), can be associated with higher social welfare compared to the unique equilib-
rium under an entirely forward-looking interest rate setting, even if they are all consistent
with the same plan. Social welfare is thus raised by a history dependent central bank
behavior that is induced by monetary policy implementation, rather than by a particular
plan based on preferences of a central banker which deviate from social welfare.
In general, history dependence aﬀects the expectations about future realizations of
macroeconomic aggregates and therefore their conditional variances.8 Here, the relevance
of a lagged variable for the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates under a reaction func-
tion ii.) or iii.) can lower welfare-reducing macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, as forecast error
variances tend to decrease with the introduction of relevant state variables. However, an
extension of the state space increases the support of the stochastic variables, which might
raise the variances of macroeconomic aggregates. We ﬁnd that this eﬀect on the variances
of macroeconomic aggregates is less important when the autocorrelation of the common
state variable, i.e., the cost-push shock, is high. The extent to which social welfare is raised
under a history dependent implementation of the plan further depends on the particular
economic structure. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the welfare gain from a history dependent
implementation increases with the severity of the distortion due to transactions frictions
and with the degree of price ﬂexibility. The main conclusion from the welfare analysis is
therefore that a central bank should implement its plan by forward-looking interest rate
adjustments only if the aggregate shock is not very persistent or transactions frictions are
negligible. Otherwise, it should implement the plan in a history dependent way.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the analysis of discretionary monetary policy
in two novel ways. Given an environment where monetary discretion allows for equilibrium
multiplicity, we, ﬁrstly, show that a potentially welfare-enhancing history dependence can
7We disregard the possibility that the central bank controls both instruments simultaneously, which
is for example considered in Adao et al. (2003). They demonstrate that the optimal allocation under
sticky prices can welfare dominate the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices, if the central bank sets the
nominal interest rate equal to a suﬃciently small value and, simultaneously, controls money supply.
8If a central bank takes into account the impact of monetary policy on expectations of a forward-
looking private sector, its plan would exhibit history dependence. See, for example, Woodford (2003a) for
a so-called optimal commitment policy under a timeless perspective.
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rate policy or a money growth policy. Secondly, the problem of equilibrium multiplicity
under monetary discretion can be eliminated if the central bank implements its plan by
state contingent money injections (but not by an inertial interest rate policy).9
The remainder is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section
3 discusses the equilibrium behavior under diﬀerent reaction functions. In section 4, we
examine the central bank’s plan under discretionary optimization and its implementation.
In section 5, we compare social welfare under diﬀerent solutions. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we describe the macroeconomic framework, which closely relates to the
model in Woodford (2003a). There are three sectors, the household sector, the production
sector, and the public sector. Cost-push shocks, which stem from exogenous changes in
the elasticity of substitution of individual labor services, are the only source of uncertainty.
There are no information asymmetries between the three sectors. Nominal (real) variables
are denoted by upper-case (lower-case) letters.
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households indexed with j ∈ [0,1].H o u s e h o l d s
have identical asset endowments and identical preferences. Household j maximizes the




βtU (cjt,l jt,M jt/Pt), (1)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and
β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility U is assumed to
be increasing in consumption c and real balances M/P, decreasing in working time l,
strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and to satisfy the usual Inada condi-
tions. Instantaneous utility U is further assumed to be separable in the utility from private
consumption and from real balances, and in the disutility of working time, U (ct,l t)=
u(cjt) − v(ljt)+ν(Mjt/Pt).
At the beginning of period t household j is endowed with holdings of money Mjt−1 and
a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment
Zjt. Before the goods market opens, households enter the asset market, where they can
adjust their portfolio and receive government transfers. Let qt,t+1 denote the period t price
of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t +1normalized by the probability
9This result corresponds to the property of nominal (in)determinacy under money growth (interest rate)
policy, which has for example been examined by Sargent and Wallace (1974). While a money growth policy
facilitates nominal determinacy under perfectly ﬂexible prices, it causes beginning-of-period real balances
to be relevant for equilibrium determination when prices are not perfectly ﬂexible. The predetermined value
of real money then serves as a equilibrium selection criterion, which rules out solutions with extraneous
states that would allow for endogenous ﬂuctuations.
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the price of a random payoﬀ Zjt+1 in period t +1is given by Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1].H o u s e h o l d s
further receive wage payments and dividends Dit from monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
indexed with i ∈ [0,1]. The budget constraint of household j can be written as




where Pt denotes the aggregate price level and wjt the (individual) real wage rate. Lump-
sum injections Ptτt, which households receive in the asset market, serve as a central bank
instrument. As will be demonstrated below, money supply can equivalently be speciﬁed
by assuming that money is injected via open market operations, instead of via lump-sum
transfers. We further assume that households have to fulﬁll a no-Ponzi game condition,
lims→∞ Etqt,t+s(Mjt+s + Zjt+1+s) ≥ 0.
We assume that households monopolistically supply diﬀerentiated labor services lj,






jt dj.T h e
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor services ηt > 1 is allowed to vary
exogenously over time. Cost minimization then leads to the following labor demand






jt dj,w h e r ewt denotes aggregate real wage rate.
Maximizing the objective (1), subject to the budget constraint (2), the labor demand
condition, and the no-Ponzi-game condition, for given initial values Zj0 and Mj,−1 leads













where π denotes the inﬂation rate (πt = Pt/Pt−1), λ the shadow price of wealth and ξ the
wage mark-up where ξt = ηt/(ηt − 1). The stochastic properties of ξt will be discussed
below. Furthermore, the budget constraint (2) holds with equality and the transversality
condition, lims→∞ βt+sEt[λjt+s(Mjt+s + Zjt+1+s)/Pt+s]=0 ,m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed. The one-
period nominal interest rate on a risk-free portfolio, which serves as an alternative central
bank instrument, is deﬁned as follows
Rt =[ Etqt,t+1]
−1 . (4)
Using (4) money demand can be written as νm(Mjt/Pt)=uc(cjt)(Rt − 1)/Rt.T h eﬁnal
consumption good is an aggregate of diﬀerentiated goods produced by monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms indexed with i ∈ [0,1]. The CES aggregator of diﬀerentiated goods








it di, with  >1,w h e r eyt is the number of units of the ﬁnal
good, yit t h ea m o u n tp r o d u c e db yﬁrm i,a n d  the constant elasticity of substitution
between these diﬀerentiated goods. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by
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is yit =( Pit/Pt)




it di.A ﬁrm i produces good yi employing a
technology which is linear in labor: yit = lit,w h e r elt =
R 1
0 litdi. Hence, labor demand
satisﬁes: mcit = wt,w h e r emcit = mct denotes real marginal costs.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as developed by Calvo
(1983). Each period ﬁrms may reset their prices with the probability 1−φ independently
of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of ﬁr m si sa s s u m e d
to adopt the previous period’s prices according Pit = Pit−1.I ne a c hp e r i o dam e a s u r e1−φ
of randomly selected ﬁrms sets new prices e Pit in order to maximize the expected sum of
discounted future dividends (Dit =( Pit − Ptmct)yit):m a x h Pit Et
P∞
s=0 φsqt,t+s(e Pityit+s −
Pt+smct+syit+s),s . t .yit+s = e Pit
− P 
t+syt+s.T h eﬁrst order condition is given by
e Pit =
 













Aggregate output is yt =( P∗
t /Pt) lt,w h e r e(P∗
t )−  =
R 1
0 P− 
it di and thus (P∗





¢−  +( 1− φ)e P− 
t .
The central bank is assumed to trade with households in the asset markets. There,
it injects money via lump sum transfers Ptτt. Its budget constraint is given by Ptτt =
Mt−Mt−1 =( µt − 1)Mt−1,w h e r eµt denotes the gross money growth rate, µt = Mt/Mt−1.
It should be noted that we can, alternatively, assume that money and government bonds
B are exclusively traded in open market operations, where their supply is characterized
by “holding ﬁscal policy constant in the face of a government asset exchange” (see, e.g.,
Sargent and Smith, 1987):( µt − 1)Mt−1 = −Bt +Rb
t−1Bt−1 and Ptτt =0 .10 A consistent
initial value for total government liabilities would be equal to zero, B−1+M−1 =0 ,w h i c h
is consistent with government solvency, lims→∞(Bt+s + Mt+s)Πs
v=1(1/Rb
t+v)=0 .T h i s
alternative speciﬁcation is then equivalent to the former speciﬁcation. Finally, the central
bank is assumed to set either the risk-free nominal interest rate Rt or the money growth
rate µt = mtπt/mt−1,w h e r em denotes real balances mt = Mt/Pt. The equilibrium for
Rt > 1 is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium for Rt > 1 is a set of sequences {yt, lt,
P∗
t , Pt, e Pt, mct, wt,m t, Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions mct = wt,( 5 )
with e Pit = e Pt,a n dP
1− 
t = φ(Pt−1)
1− +(1− φ) e P1− 
t , the households’ ﬁrst order conditions
uc(yt)wt = vl(lt)ξt, uc(yt)/Pt = βRtEt [uc(yt+1)/Pt+1], νm(mt)/uc(yt)=( Rt − 1)/Rt,t h e
aggregate resource constraint yt =( P∗
t /Pt) lt,w h e r e(P∗




¢−  +( 1− φ)e P− 
t ,
and the transversality condition, given a monetary policy, a sequence {εt}∞
t=0, and initial
values P−1 > 0, P∗
−1 > 0,a n dm−1P−1 = M−1 > 0.
10The households’ budget constraint would then be given by Bjt + Mjt ≤ R
b
t−1Bjt−1 + Mjt−1 + Zjt −
Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Ptwjtljt −Ptcjt +
U 1
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b ξt =l o g ξt − ξ and ρ ∈ [0,1). The innovations are assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and a constant variance, εt ∼ N(0,var e).
3 Equilibrium behavior under diﬀerent reaction functions
In this section we present the log-linearized version of the model described in the previous
section and summarize the main equilibrium properties of the model under diﬀerent reac-
tion functions for the monetary instrument. The equilibrium conditions given in deﬁnition
1 are log-linearized at the deterministic steady state.11 Given that our analysis focusses
on the stabilization properties of monetary policy, we abstract from long-run eﬀects of dif-
ferent monetary policy regimes and assume that they are consistent with the same steady
state. We further assume that the steady state is characterized by a constant price level,
such that the steady state values for the inﬂation rate, the money growth rate, and the
interest rate are given by π = µ =1and R =1 /β > 1. A steady state is then character-
ized by uniquely determined values for output uc(y)/vl(y)=Ω,w h e r eΩ = ξ  
 −1 > 1,a n d
for real balances νm(m)=uc(y)(1− β). Throughout the paper, b xt denotes the percent
deviation of a generic variable xt from its steady state value x : b x =l o g ( xt) − log(x).A n
equilibrium of the log-linear model is deﬁned as follows:
A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the model at the
steady state is a set of sequences {b πt, b mt, b yt, b Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying
σb yt =σEtb yt+1 − b Rt + Etb πt+1, (6)
b πt =ωb yt + βEtb πt+1 + χb ξt, (7)




]−1 b Rt, (8)
where ω = χ(ϑ+σ), σ = −ucc(c)c/uc(c) > 0, ϑ = vll(l)l/vl(l) > 0, σm = −mνmm(m)/νm(m) >
0,a n dχ =( 1− φ)(1 − βφ)/φ, the transversality condition, for a monetary policy, a se-
quence {b ξt}∞
t=0, and given initial values for nominal balances M−1 and the price level
P−1.12
In what follows, we consider three types of monetary policy regimes which are char-
acterized by state contingent adjustments of the prevailing central bank instrument. The
ﬁrst monetary policy regime is characterized by a forward-looking reaction function for
11Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that the bounds on the mark-up ﬂuctuations are suﬃ-
ciently tight, such that the central bank can always ensure the nominal interest rate to be larger than one,
Rt > 1.
12Note that output e yt can be interpreted as a measure for the output gap (measured by output deviations
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b Rt = ρπb πt + ρyb yt + ρξb ξt. (9)
The reaction function (9) allows for an explicit feedback from the exogenous state (the
cost-push shock). This is the main diﬀerence to widely applied interest rate feedback rules,
which are speciﬁed without a feedback from private sector shocks ρξ =0 .
For the second regime we consider a history dependent reaction function for the risk-
free nominal interest rate, which allows to smooth interest rates
b Rt = ρR b Rt−1 + ρs
πb πt + ρs
yb yt + ρs
ξb ξt,ρ R ∈ (0,1), (10)
where ρs
π/(1 − ρR) and ρs
y/(1 − ρR) measure the long-run feedback from inﬂation and
output. In contrast to (9), the inertial reaction function (10) features a feedback from
past conditions, b Rt−1. By adjusting the current interest rate contingent to a changes in a
lagged variable, central bank behavior becomes history dependent under (10).
Under the third regime, the central bank applies a reaction function for the money
growth rate:
b µt = µπb πt + µyb yt + µξb ξt. (11)
Since b µt = b mt + b πt − b mt−1, the reaction function (11) introduces beginning-of-period
real balances, b mt−1, as a backward-looking element. Monetary policy might therefore be
history dependent, even though past conditions are not considered as policy indicators (in
contrast to 10).
The following lemma summarizes main properties of the fundamental solutions for the
equilibrium sequences for the endogenous variables x0
t =[ b πt b mt b yt b Rt] for monetary policy
satisfying (9), (10), or (11). It should be noted that the fundamental solution, i.e., the
minimum state variable solution, is identical with the uniquely determined and stable
solution in our framework.13 The derivation of the conditions in part 1. and 2. of the
lemma can be found in Woodford (2003a). The proof of the third part relates to the
analysis in Schabert (2005) and is provided in appendix 7.1.
Lemma 1 Consider the fundamental solution for the equilibrium sequences {xt}∞
t=0 sat-
isfying (6)-(8) and either (9), (10), or (11).
1. Under an interest rate policy (9) it takes the form b xt = x(b ξt), and is the unique
stable equilibrium solution if and only if ρπ +[ ( 1− β)/ω]ρy > 1.
2. Under an inertial interest rate policy (10) it takes the form b xt = x(b Rt−1,b ξt),a n d
is the unique stable equilibrium solution if and only if ρs
π +[ ( 1− β)/ω]ρs
y > 1 − ρR.
Then, the single stable eigenvalue δR = ∂ b Rt/∂ b Rt−1 satisﬁes δR ∈ (0,1).
13See McCallum (2004) for a comprehensive discussion of the relation between determinate solutions
and the minimum state variable solution in rational expectations models.
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unique stable equilibrium solution if and only if a.) µπ +[ ( 1− β)/ω]µy < 1 and b.)




(β +1 ) ] /[(R − 1)ωσm].T h e n ,t h es i n g l e
stable eigenvalue δm = ∂ b mt/∂ b mt−1 satisﬁes δm ∈ (0,1).
The properties summarized in the ﬁrst two parts of lemma 1 are well established (see
Woodford, 2001, 2003a) and are, therefore, not discussed in further detail. Subsequently,
we will refer to the notion of an active (passive) interest rate policy, which is deﬁned as an
interest rate setting satisfying ρπ+[(1−β)/ω]ρy > 1 (< 1)o r(ρs
π+[(1−β)/ω]ρs
y)/(1−ρR) >
1 (< 1). According to lemma 1 part 3, the central bank is able to ensure the existence
of a unique and stable equilibrium if the response of money supply to a rise in output
or inﬂation is suﬃciently small, in the sense that the conditions a.) and b.) are satisﬁed.
If, however, money supply satisﬁes µπ +[ ( 1− β)/ω]µy > 1,t h e na n yr i s ei ni n ﬂation (or
output) causes the central bank to raise the stock of nominal balances, which tends to
increase the price level. Given that prices are not fully ﬂexible, a rise in nominal balances
is accompanied by a rise in real balances, which tends to lower the nominal interest rate
by (8) and to raise aggregate demand by (6). Hence, monetary policy stimulates real
activity and further increases inﬂation, such that self-fulﬁlling expectations or explosive
equilibrium sequences are possible. The likelihood for explosiveness thereby increases with
the price rigidity, i.e., with the fraction of ﬁrms that do not set prices in an optimal way.
It should be noted that condition a.) ensures the existence of exactly one stable eigen-
value, which lies between zero and one, and therefore the existence and the uniqueness
of stable and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences. Condition b.) further guarantees that
there is no additional negative and stable eigenvalue, which would allow for an alternative
stable solution characterized by equilibrium sequences that oscillate around the steady
state.
4 Monetary policy under discretion
In this section we characterize the central bank’s plan under discretionary optimization
and discuss the existence of multiple solutions to the plan. In the second part, we establish
the existence of reactions functions of the type (9), (10), or (11) that implement the central
bank’s plan and examine their ability to solve the indeterminacy problem. Throughout
the subsequent analysis, we repeatedly apply some standard parameter values for σ, ϑ,
β, φ,a n d  for demonstrative purposes. They are given in table 1. We set (the inverse
of) the intertemporal substitution elasticities equal to two, σ = ϑ = σm =2 ,i m p l y i n g
the income elasticity of money demand to equal one (see 8). We further set β =0 .99,
  =6 ,a n dφ =0 .8; the latter being consistent with empirical evidence, for example by
Gali and Gertler (1999).14 As an alternative, we consider a lower value for the fraction
14Given these parameter values, the composite coeﬃcients in (7) equal χ =0 .052,a n dω =0 .208.
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microeconomic evidence (see Bils and Klenow, 2004). Finally, for the steady state velocity
ν = y/m we use the value 2 for the benchmark case and, alternatively, the value 0.44,
which is taken from Christiano et al. (2005).
Table 1 Benchmark parameter values
σσ m ϑβ φ  πν
222 0 . 9 9 0 . 8 6 1 2
4.1 Discretionary policy and equilibrium multiplicity
We now examine the plan of a central bank that aims to maximize social welfare. We
realistically assume that the central bank does not have access to a technology which
enables a commitment to a once-and-for-all policy. Thus, we assume that it aims to
maximize social welfare in a discretionary way. We follow Woodford (2003a) and apply a
linear-quadratic approximation of household welfare at the undistorted steady state. Since
we want to abstract from long-run distortions due to monopolistic competition we assume
that an unspeciﬁed (lump-sum tax ﬁnanced) wage subsidy ensures Ω =1 .W e f u r t h e r
assume that the long-run distortion due to transactions frictions is negligible.15 Applying
a second-order Taylor-expansion of household welfare and of the private sector equilibrium
conditions at the undistorted steady state, leads to the following objective, as shown by













t + αb y2

















and Υ > 0. Applying the parameter values in table 1, the weights in the loss function
are α =0 .0347 and ϕ =0 .215. The loss function weight ϕ on the interest rate variance,
which provides a measure for the severity of the distortion induced by transactions fric-
tions, is thus 6.2-times larger than the weight on output ﬂuctuations for our benchmark
parametrization.17 The relative size of the weight ϕ, which will be crucial for the subse-
quent analysis, is similar to Woodford’s (2003b) value (4.9) and much smaller than Walsh’s
(2005) value (25.7). Evidently, the weight on the inﬂation variance is still larger than the
15This can be rationalized by an (unspeciﬁed) constant interest rate on money holdings R
m,w h i c hi ss e t
by the central bank in a way that minimizes welfare costs of money holdings in the steady state, R
m
→ 1/β
(see Woodford, 2003a). The steady state velocity would then relate to a long-run satiation level of money
holdings, which is characterized by m = y/ν.
16This approximation of household welfare is for example also applied in Woodford (2003b), Brueckner
and Schabert (2005), Kurozumi (2005), or Walsh (2005) for isomorphic models.
17The coeﬃcient ϕ would be equal to zero in a “cashless” version of this model (see Woodford, 2003a).
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In the subsequent section we will apply alternative values for the velocity ν and for the
interest elasticity of money (induced by changes in σm), which alter the welfare costs of
interest rate changes, and we change the fraction of non-optimizing ﬁrms φ.
The central bank’s problem under discretion can be summarized by a simple linear-
quadratic set-up, where (12) serve as the policy objective and the linear equilibrium condi-
tions (6)-(8) as constraints. Taking expectations as given, leads to the following ﬁrst order
conditions for all periods t ≥ 0:b πt +φ2t =0 , αb yt −χσφ2t +σφ1t =0 ,a n dϕb Rt +φ1t =0 ,
where φ1t and φ2t denote the multiplier on the constraints (6) and (7), respectively. We
c a nt h e nd e ﬁne a central bank’s plan as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 A central bank’s plan is a set of sequences {b πt, b mt, b yt, b Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying
σϕb Rt = αb yt + ωb πt, ∀t ≥ 0, (13)
(6)-(8), and the transversality condition, given {b ξt}∞
t=0 and an initial value b m−1.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst part of lemma 1, a monetary policy satisfying (9) is associated with
a unique equilibrium solution if and only if ρπ +
1−β
ω ρy > 1.T h ec e n t r a lb a n k ’ sﬁrst order
condition (13), which is often called "targeting rule" (see Svensson, 1999), implies the
relation between the interest rate, inﬂation, and output to satisfy ρπ = ω
σϕ and ρy = α
σϕ
(as well as ρξ =0 ). The central bank’s plan therefore exhibits a unique solution only
if the weight ϕ is suﬃciently small. Otherwise, discretionary policy is associated with
equilibrium multiplicity, which has also been shown by Brueckner and Schabert (2005)
and Kurozumi (2005) for an isomorphic model and by Albanesi et al. (2003), King and
Wolman (2004), and Siu (2005) for models with diﬀerent price setting schemes. The
condition for the existence of multiple equilibria is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The central bank’s plan exhibits a unique stable solution if and only if ϕ<ϕ ∗,
where ϕ∗ =
ω+(1−β)/ 
σ . This solution takes the form b xt = x(b ξt).I fϕ>ϕ ∗, there further
exist stable autoregressive solutions to the plan.
According to lemma 2, the central bank’s plan under discretion is associated with a
unique solution if the distortion induced by transactions frictions are suﬃciently small
such that ϕ<ϕ ∗.18 Applying the parameter values in table 1, leads to a threshold equal
to ϕ∗ =0 .105. Hence, our benchmark value for the interest rate weight (ϕ =0 .215)c l e a r l y
exceeds this threshold, indicating that there exists multiple solutions to the plan. When
transactions frictions are non-negligible, the central bank is not willing to strongly stabilize
inﬂation and the output gap, since the associated interest rate adjustments lead to welfare
18This corresponds to the result in Albanesi et al. (2003), who show that multiple equilibria can arise
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1−β
ω ρy < 1,w h i c h
allows for multiple equilibria (see lemma 1).19 Then, there exists a stable solution without
any endogenous state variable, b xt = x(b ξt), as well as stable autoregressive equilibrium
solutions that feature a lagged endogenous state variable, b xt = x(b yt−1, b ξt), b xt = x(b πt−1,
b ξt), b xt = x(b Rt−1, b ξt),o rb xt = x(b mt−1, b ξt). Further, there exist non-fundamental solutions,
featuring an extraneous state variable, that allow for expectations to become self-fulﬁlling,
i.e., for sunspot equilibria. In the subsequent analysis we will not apply the latter type of
solutions.
4.2 Implementing the plan under discretionary optimization
In this section we take a closer look at the implementation of the central bank’s plan given
in deﬁnition 2. We examine if and how a central bank can implement its plan with reaction
functions of the form (9), (10), and (11). In particular, we want to assess if the plan can
be implemented in a stable and unique way, such that explosive equilibrium sequences and
endogenous ﬂuctuations are avoided. Evidently, a forward-looking interest rate reaction
function (9) can uniquely implement the plan if ϕ<ϕ ∗, since the central bank’s ﬁrst order
condition (13) can be interpreted as a speciﬁcc a s ew i t hρξ =0 .I f ϕ>ϕ ∗,t h ec e n t r a l
bank can design forward-looking reaction functions with ρξ 6=0which uniquely implement
its plan. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the central bank controls the interest rate in a forward-
looking way. Then, there exist inﬁnitely many reaction functions (9) which uniquely im-
plement the central bank’s plan. They are characterized by ρξ 6=0 .
Proof. The fundamental equilibrium solution under (9) is characterized by b πt = η1b ξt and
b yt = η2b ξt, and therefore b πt =
η1
η2b yt. Lemma 1 part 1 then implies that for any ζπ and
ζy satisfying (ζπ + ω
σϕ)+[ ( 1− β)/ω](ζy + α
σϕ) > 1 there exists an interest rate reaction
function b Rt =( ζπ + ω
σϕ)b πt +( ζy + α
σϕ)b yt − (ζπη1 + ζyη2)b ξt that uniquely implements the
fundamental solution. ¥
Hence, regardless whether its plan exhibits a unique solution (ϕ<ϕ ∗) or multiple solutions
(ϕ>ϕ ∗), the central bank can always uniquely implement the fundamental solution by
choosing a particular forward-looking reaction function of the type (9). To be more precise,
it can design a forward-looking reaction function, which is characterized by a feedback from
inﬂation and output which is strong enough to rule out multiple solutions (by satisfying
ρπ +[ ( 1− β)/ω]ρy > 1). At the same time, an appropriate feedback from the exogenous
state variable ensures that the implemented equilibrium is consistent with the fundamental
solution to the plan.
19For the benchmark parameter values, the targeting rule can be written as e Rt =0 .485 · e πt +0 .08 · e yt.
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picture changes. If transactions frictions are very small such that ϕ<ϕ ∗,t h e r ei sa
unique stable solution to the central bank’s plan of the form b xt = x(b ξt). According to
lemma 1 part 2, the central bank can therefore not apply an inertial interest rate reaction
function to implement its plan (in a stable way). If transactions frictions are suﬃciently
large, ϕ>ϕ ∗, the central bank can in principle implement a stable set of sequences
of the form b xt = x(b Rt−1, b ξt) which are consistent with its plan. A closer look at the
feedback coeﬃcients of the inertial interest rate reaction function however shows that such
an equilibrium is not uniquely determined.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank controls the interest rate according to an
inertial reaction function (10). If ϕ<ϕ ∗, it cannot implement its plan in a stable way.
If ϕ>ϕ ∗,i tc a n n o ti m p l e m e n ti t sp l a ni nau n i q u ew a y .
Proof. Consider an inertial reaction function b Rt = ρ∗
R b Rt−1 + ρ∗
πb πt + ρ∗
yb yt + ρ∗
ξb ξt with
ρ∗
R ∈ (0,1), which implements a set of equilibrium sequences {b x∗
t}∞
t=0 consistent with the
plan under discretionary optimization. According to lemma 1 part 2, the fundamental
equilibrium solution then takes the form b xt = x(b Rt−1, b ξt). According to lemma 2, the
sequences {b x∗
t}∞
t=0 are unstable if ϕ<ϕ ∗ and stable if ϕ>ϕ ∗ (see also appendix 7.4).
Now suppose that ϕ>ϕ ∗ (A1) and that ρ∗
π +[ ( 1− β)/ω]ρ∗
y > 1 − ρ∗
R (A2) are satisﬁed.
Then, the set of sequences {b x∗
t}∞
t=0 would be uniquely determined and stable, and the
interest rate solution would read b Rt = δR b Rt−1 + δReb ξt with δR ∈ (0,1). Combining the













b ξt. Given that the solution satisﬁes b xt = x(b Rt−1, b ξt),i tf o l l o w s
immediately that for any given ρ∗




ξ} that is consistent with the central bank’s ﬁrst order condition (13). These coeﬃcients
have to satisfy ρ∗
π/(1 − ρ∗
R/δR)=ω/(σϕ) > 0, ρ∗
y/(1 − ρ∗




R >δ R,t h ec o e ﬃcients ρ∗
π and ρ∗
y have to be negative, which
contradicts assumption (A2). If ρ∗

















σϕ < 1. Hence, if ϕ>ϕ ∗ the central bank’s plan cannot uniquely be implemented.
¥
Proposition 2 thus indicates that the central bank’s plan cannot be implemented by an
inertial interest rate reaction function in a stable and unique way. If transactions frictions
are suﬃciently large such that ϕ>ϕ ∗, the central bank’s ﬁrst order condition (13) requires
passive (short-run) interest rate adjustments. In order to implement equilibrium sequences
that are consistent with this behavior, an inertial reaction function (10) has to exhibit
feedback coeﬃcients that imply interest rates to be passively adjusted in the long-run,
ρs
π+[(1−β)/ω]ρs
y < 1−ρR, which allows for further solutions that exhibit two endogenous
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interest rate reaction function to implement its plan in a history dependent way, it does
not rule out equilibrium multiplicity and therefore allows for endogenous ﬂuctuations.
Now consider the case where the central bank uses money injections as its instru-
ment and controls the money growth rate in a state contingent way (11). The minimum
state variable solution for a rational expectations equilibrium then takes the form b mt =
δmb mt−1+δmeb ξt , b πt = δπmb mt−1+δπeb ξt, b yt = δymb mt−1+δyeb ξt,a n db Rt = δRm b mt−1+δReb ξt
(see lemma 1 part 1). We want to assess whether there exists a money growth reaction
function of the form (11) that can implement the central bank’s plan.20
Lemma 3 Suppose that the central bank uses money injections as its instrument. Then,
there exists a money growth reaction function (11) that implements equilibrium sequences
that are consistent with the plan. It satisﬁes
µπ = κ1(µπ,µ y), µy = κ2(µπ,µ y), µξ = κ3(µπ,µ y,µ ξ), (14)
















δRmδme)+σmµy(δmeδym+δyeκ)+(δemδπm+δπeκ)((µπ − 1)σm−1)], and κ =( ρ − δm).
Proof. See appendix 7.2.
According to lemma 3, the central bank’s plan can in principle be implemented by a money
growth reaction functions (11). It remains to analyze whether a money growth reaction
function can implement the plan in a stable and unique way. The following proposition
refers to the particular reaction function characterized in lemma 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the central bank implements its plan with a money growth
reaction function satisfying (11) and (14). If ϕ>ϕ ∗, the equilibrium sequences are stable,
non-oscillatory, and uniquely determined. If ϕ<ϕ ∗, they are unstable.
Proof. See appendix 7.3.
A money growth reaction function of the type (11) can thus implement the central bank’s
plan in a stable, non-oscillatory, and unique way, if transactions frictions are suﬃciently
large (ϕ>ϕ ∗). Otherwise (ϕ<ϕ ∗), a money growth reaction function cannot implement
the plan in a stable way, which corresponds to the case of inertial interest rate adjustments
(see proposition 2). In contrast to the latter case, a central bank can avoid equilibrium
multiplicity by applying the money growth rate as its instrument. Thus, a money growth
policy ensures a unique determination of the plan while a corresponding (passive) interest
rate policy allows for multiple equilibria in our sticky price model. This results corresponds
20This analysis relates to Schabert (2005), where the implementation of interest rate targets via money
supply adjustments is examined for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of aggregate supply and for money demand.
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prices are perfectly ﬂexible (see Sargent and Wallace, 1975). While the predetermined
value of beginning-of-period real balances serve as equilibrium selection criterion under a
money growth reaction function (11), the mere introduction of the lagged interest rate as
a policy indicator is not suﬃcient for this purpose.
5 Monetary instruments and social welfare
In this section we examine social welfare when the central bank applies diﬀerent instru-
ments in order to implement its plan under discretionary optimization. To compare the
welfare implications of diﬀerent monetary policy regimes, we focus on the case ϕ>ϕ ∗
(see lemma 2). We restrict our attention to stable fundamental (minimum state variable)
solutions which are characterized in lemma 1. To be more precise, in the case where the
central bank sets the interest rate in a forward-looking way (9) or controls the money
growth rate according to (11), we assume that it applies a particular reaction function for
the prevailing instrument that ensures its plan to be implemented in a unique and stable
way.21 A ss h o w ni np r o p o s i t i o n2 ,t h i si sn o tp o s s i b l ef o rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ec e n t r a lb a n k
applies an inertial interest rate reaction function (10).
The fundamental solution under an inertial interest rate policy reads b πt = η1b ξt, b yt =
η2b ξt, b Rt = η3b ξt and b mt = η4b ξt (see part 1 of lemma 1). If the central bank applies an
inertial interest rate reaction function or a money growth reaction function, the equilibrium
sequences become history dependent. Under an inertial interest rate reaction function, the
solution takes the form b Rt = ρ1 b Rt−1 + ρ2b ξt , b πt = ρ3 b Rt−1 + ρ4b ξt,a n db yt = ρ5 b Rt−1 + ρ6b ξt
(see lemma 1 part 2). Under a money growth reaction function it takes the form b mt =
δ1 b mt−1+δ2b ξt, b πt = δ3 b mt−1+δ4b ξt, b yt = δ5 b mt−1+δ6b ξt,a n db Rt = δ7 b mt−1+δ8b ξt (see lemma
1 part 3). The solution coeﬃcients are derived in appendix 7.4.
Before we turn to the welfare comparison, which will be based on the unconditional
variances of the endogenous variables, we brieﬂy want to assess the diﬀerence between
the conditional variances of a forward-looking solution and of a history dependent
solution to the central bank’s plan. In particular, we compare the conditional variance


















4var(b ξt). Since, the solution coeﬃcients (given in appendix 7.4)
are in general too complex to compare these variances, we apply the simplifying parameter
values σ =1, σm =1 , ϑ =0 ,a n dv =1 . We then obtain tractable expressions for the
limiting case where the discount factor converges to one β → 1.22 The ratio of the variances
21The existence of such reaction functions have been established in proposition 1 for an interest rate
regime and in proposition 3 for a money growth regime for ϕ>ϕ
∗.





















Working Paper Series No. 533






















∆ + δ1 (ω +1− δ1 +1− ρ)
¸2
, (15)
where ∆ = ωρ − (1 − ρ)
2. Suppose that the autocorrelation of cost-push shocks is suf-
ﬁciently large such that ρ/(1 − ρ)
2 > 1/ω. Then, ∆ > 0 and the term in the square
brackets in (15) is smaller than one, given that the solution under the money growth re-
action function is stable and non-oscillatory δ1 ∈ (0,1). Thus, for any given value b mt−1,
the inﬂation variance under a money growth policy can be smaller than under a forward-




t) < 1, if the variance of the cost-push shock
var(b ξt) is suﬃciently large. If, however, the autocorrelation is small ρ/(1 − ρ)
2 < 1/ω,
the inﬂation variance for a history dependent solution is always larger then for a purely
forward-looking solution. Under a history dependent solution, the responses to a shock
can be spread out over time and might not die out after the shock disappears. This eﬀect
tends to raise the variance, in particular, when shocks are not very persistent. If the
autocorrelation of the common exogenous state is large, the macroeconomic responses to
shocks can persist even if there is no endogenous state variable. If the variance of the
exogenous state var(b ξt) is further large enough, then a history dependent solution can
be associated with a smaller variance, as shock responses are smoothed. This principle
also applies for the unconditional variances, which will be demonstrated in the subsequent
welfare analysis.
For the welfare analysis we apply the second order approximation to household welfare
(12). Since policy implementation is — by assumption — ensured to be steady state invari-
ant, we use the welfare measure E0
P∞
t=0 βtLt,w h e r eLt = var(b πt)+αvar(b yt)+ϕvar(b Rt)
and var(b xt) denotes the variance of a generic variable b xt.L e t varx denote its uncon-
ditional variance, i.e., the variance conditional upon the state in period t =0 .W e






L = varπ + αvary + ϕvarR. (16)
Since the discount factor is held constant throughout our analysis, L provides a measure
for the welfare ranking of allocations implemented by diﬀerent policy regimes. Given the
solution coeﬃcients under the reaction functions (9)-(11), which are derived in appendix
7.4, we compute values for the variances.
The unconditional variances for the fundamental solution under a forward-looking in-
terest rate reaction function are varπ = η2
1varξ,v a r y = η2
2varξ,a n dvarR = η2
3varξ,
where varξ =( 1 − ρ2)−1vare denotes the variance of the cost-push shock. The un-
conditional variances for the fundamental solution under an inertial interest rate reac-
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and varR = ρ2
2(1 − ρ2
1)−1varξ. The unconditional variances for the fundamental so-


























Table 2 Welfare losses L/varξ for alternative instruments
ρ i.) Forward-looking ii.) Backward-looking iii.) Forward-looking
interest rate policy interest rate policy# money growth policy
0.95 0.016 0.0020 0.0019
0.9 0.079 0.0021 0.0021
0.8 0.57 0.0030 0.0032
0.7 0.049 0.0047 0.0051
0.6 0.020 0.0075 0.0082
0.5 0.011 0.012 0.013
0.4 0.0074 0.021 0.023
Note: The eigenvalue under ii.) and iii.) equals 0.83 and # indicates indeterminacy.
Table 2 presents (relative) welfare losses L/varξ of the three equilibrium solutions for
the parameter values in table 1. (The associated unconditional variances can be found
given in table A1 in appendix 7.5.) The results are reported for various values for the
autocorrelation of cost-push shocks ρ. It should be noted that we present relative variances
varx/varξ, in order to abstract from changes in variances of endogenous variables that are
solely due to changes in varξ induced by diﬀerent degrees of autocorrelation. The loss
L/varξ under the unique solution for a forward-looking interest rate policy i.) changes
with ρ in a non-monotonic way. For high values (ρ>0.8) the relative loss decreases
with ρ since the variance of the cost-push shock varξ rises more strongly with higher
values for ρ than the unconditional variances of endogenous variables. For ρ<0.8,t h i s
eﬀect is reversed. In contrast, under the history dependent solutions implemented by
an inertial interest rate policy or a money growth policy, the relative loss monotonically
decreases with ρ. These solutions exhibit a backward-looking element that is independent
of the shock persistence, namely, an endogenous state variable with a non-zero eigenvalue
(which equals 0.83 for the benchmark parameter values). As a consequence, the variances
of endogenous variables are much less aﬀected by ρ than varξ. It should be noted that
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estimation of a similar model leads leads to ρ =0 .95.
Overall, the welfare losses of both history dependent solutions are closely related,
though the loss under ii.) is almost always slightly smaller than under iii.).F o r ρ =
0.95, the relative loss (0.016) for a purely forward-looking solution induced by a forward-
looking interest rate policy, is clearly larger than those under an inertial interest rate
policy (0.0020) and a money growth policy (0.0019). As demonstrated for the conditional
inﬂation variances (see 15), forecast error variances can be reduced by the inclusion of a
relevant lagged endogenous variable in the information set. Yet, unconditional variances
can increase with the eigenvalues of endogenous variables, which enlarge the support of
their distributions. Depending on whether the former or the latter eﬀect dominates, a
history dependent solution can, therefore, lead to higher or lower welfare losses. The
latter eﬀect becomes less relevant if the common (exogenous) state already exhibits a high
eigenvalue ρ. For our benchmark parameterization, ρ>0.5 is suﬃcient for this. Then,
social welfare is higher when the central bank implements its plan in a history dependent
way, i.e., by ii.) or iii.). If the autocorrelation ρ is low (here ρ ≤ 0.5), the welfare-reducing
impact of the endogenous state on the variance of macroeconomic variables prevails, such
that social welfare is higher under a forward-looking interest rate policy.
Table 3 Welfare losses L/varξ for a lower interest rate elasticity (σ = σm =4 )
ρ i.) Forward-looking ii.) Backward-looking iii.) Forward-looking
interest rate policy interest rate policy# money growth policy
0.95 0.44 0.017 0.017
0.9 0.12 0.029 0.030
0.8 0.037 0.057 0.058
0.7 0.020 0.092 0.094
0.6 0.012 0.14 0.15
0.5 0.0084 0.22 0.23
0.4 0.0061 0.37 0.38
Note: The eigenvalue under ii.) and iii.) equals 0.98 and # indicates indeterminacy.
Table 3 further presents corresponding results for the case where the macroeconomic dis-
tortion due to transactions frictions is smaller. This is induced by setting σ and σm equal
to 4 such that the interest elasticity of money demand is half as large, while the income
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rises to α =0 .07, whereas the weight on interest rate ﬂuctuations falls to ϕ =0 .107 (while
ϕ∗ equals 0.104). Given that the distortion due to transactions frictions is less costly, a
welfare gain from a history dependent implementation of the time consistent plan requires
a higher value for ρ than before. A forward-looking interest rate policy then leads to lower
welfare losses if ρ ≤ 0.8. We further examined the case where the steady state velocity ν
is lowered to a value of 0.44, which is taken from Christiano et al. (2005). This evidently
emphasizes the role of money and therefore the welfare costs of interest rate changes mea-
sured by ϕ (see 12), while it leaves the private sector equilibrium conditions unaﬀected.
The weight ϕ then almost equals the weight on the inﬂation variance ϕ =0 .98,w h i l eα
equals 0.035. A a consequence, the threshold for ρ falls to 0.4 (see table A2 in appendix
7.5).23
Table 4 Welfare losses L/varξ under more ﬂexible prices (φ =0 .5)
ρ i.) Forward-looking ii.) Backward-looking iii.) Interest rate policy
Interest rate policy Interest rate policy# Money growth policy
0.95 0.041 0.022 0.022
0.9 0.077 0.025 0.026
0.8 0.36 0.037 0.039
0.7 3.66 0.063 0.065
0.6 19.21 0.11 0.11
0.5 1.68 0.20 0.21
0.4 0.69 0.38 0.39
Note: The eigenvalue under ii.) and iii.) equals 0.63 and # indicates indeterminacy.
To get an intuition for the role of transactions frictions, suppose that the autocorrelation
ρ equals zero, such that Etb yt+1 = Etb πt+1 =0under an interest rate policy. Further
consider a cost-push shock that tends to raise inﬂation. Then, a reduction in output (and
inﬂation) requires a strong interest rate adjustment since the aggregate demand condition
σ(b yt − Etb yt+1)=−(b Rt − Etb πt+1) reduces to b yt = −σ−1 b Rt. Under a history dependent
solution, a reduction in current output implies b yt <E tb yt+1 < 0 ⇒ |b yt − Etb yt+1| < |b yt| in
23It should be noted that the relative losses under the history dependent solutions are then also not
strictly decreasing in ρ, which is (partially) due to the lower eigenvalue 0.75.
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are required as long as monetary policy stabilizes expected inﬂation by applying small or
negative values for µπ and for µy. Thus, the change in expectation formation can reduce
the interest rate variance and, according to the central bank’s ﬁrst order condition (13),
also the variances of the other endogenous variables. As a consequence, welfare losses can
be reduced under a history dependent solution, while the welfare gain increases with the
interest elasticity of money demand and decreases with the velocity. Further, when prices
are more ﬂexible, future inﬂation is expected to return faster to its steady state value,
which also tends to reduce the required increase in the nominal interest rate and, thus,
welfare losses. When, for example, the fraction of non-optimizing price setters is set to a
smaller value (φ =0 .5), which is more in accordance with microeconomic evidence (see
Bils and Klenow, 2004), there is a welfare gain of a history dependent implementation
even for an autocorrelation of ρ =0 .4 (see table 4).
6C o n c l u s i o n
When money is held to reduce transactions costs, a central bank should abstain from
strong adjustments of nominal interest rates. This might however be necessary for the
stabilization of prices in an environment where price movements are associated with welfare
costs. If the central bank acts in a discretionary way such a trade-oﬀ can lead to an
optimal policy plan which fails to uniquely pin down an allocation and equilibrium price
system. Or, put in terms of New Keynesian macroeconomics, the central bank’s plan under
discretionary optimization can imply interest rate adjustments that violate the Taylor-
principle. Once a policy plan is consistent with multiple equilibria, diﬀerent central bank
operating procedures can be associated with diﬀerent macroeconomic outcomes.
In this paper we apply a standard New Keynesian model and compare social welfare of
diﬀerent equilibrium solutions to the central bank’s plan under diﬀerent means of monetary
policy implementation. The central bank either sets the nominal interest rate in a forward-
looking way or in an inertial way, or it uses money injections. Since the central bank acts
under discretion, it does not account for its impact on private sector expectations such
that its plan does not exhibit any backward-looking element. However, monetary policy
can be history dependent if the central bank implements its plan by inertial interest rate
adjustments or by money injections. By providing a link to past conditions, monetary
policy then alters the way private sector expectations are built and can thereby aﬀect
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. As responses to aggregate shocks are smoothed out, a his-
tory dependent monetary policy implementation can reduce welfare losses compared to an
entirely forward-looking conduct of monetary policy. In particular, this welfare gain in-
creases with the persistence of cost-push shocks, with the interest rate elasticity of money
demand, and with the degree of price ﬂexibility. However, the central bank can only avoid
a history dependent equilibrium to exhibit real indeterminacy if it implements its plan
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variable and serves as an equilibrium selection criterion. Correspondingly, the interest rate
should be applied as the monetary policy instrument if transactions frictions are negligibly
small compared to distortions induced by price rigidities.
The results in this paper can further be interpreted in an alternative way. Studies
on optimal monetary policy usually apply stylized models where the issue of policy im-
plementation is not explicitly considered. While some real world central banks might be
able to change interest rate targets by mere announcements, the majority of central banks
still implements operating targets by quantity adjustments in open market operations. A
reduction of monetary policy to (forward-looking) interest rate adjustments can therefore
overemphasize problems that originate in the lack of history dependence. These prob-
lems might in fact be less severe if one considers the underlying money supply behavior,




Working Paper Series No. 533
October 20057 Appendix
7.1 Proof of lemma 1
To establish the claim made in the third part of the lemma, we eliminate the interest rate
with the money demand condition (8). The model under a money growth policy can then
be summarized by (6), the reaction function (11), and Rσb yt = σEtb yt+1 +(R − 1)σm b mt +
Etb πt+1, where we used R = R for convenience. The model can further be written as
(b mt Etb πt+1 Etb xt+1)
0 = A (b mt−1 b πt b xt)




















The characteristic polynomial of A is given by




ω +[ 1+( 1+β)R]σ +
¡








Given that the model exhibits one predetermined, b mt−1, and two jump variables, b πt and
b ct, stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences require exactly one stable eigenvalue.
To derive the conditions therefore, we use that the value of Q(X) at X =0:Q(0) =
−Rβ−1 < −1.T h u s , det(A)=−Q(0) > 1 implying that there are either two or zero
negative eigenvalues, and that there is at least one unstable eigenvalue. The existence of
a stable root lying between zero and one, thus, requires Q(1) > 0. Examining Q(X) at





ω(1 − µπ) − (1 − β)µy
¢
,





While this ensures X1 ∈ (0,1) and thus the existence of a solution with stable and non-
oscillatory equilibrium sequences, uniqueness additionally requires the remaining roots,






σm (R − 1)
£
µπω + µy (1 + β)
¤
− [2 + (R − 1)σm]ω − 2σ (R +1 )( β +1 )
ª
.
As det(A) > 1, two further stable roots (either complex or real) cannot exist, since they
would necessarily lead to a determinant with an absolute value that is smaller than one.
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ω + σ (R +1 )( β +1 )
(R − 1)ωσm
.
Hence, the equilibrium sequences are stable and uniquely determined if and only if µπ +
1−β




(R−1)ωσm . Then, the single stable eigenvalue lies
between zero and one X1 ∈ (0,1). ¥
7.2 Proof of lemma 3
To characterize the equilibrium behavior of nominal interest rates under a state contingent
money growth policy b µt = b mt + b πt − b mt−1 = µπb πt + µyb yt + µξb ξt, we use the equilibrium




σmb mt+b πt+1 and money demand σmb mt+ 1
R−1
b Rt = σb yt,
to get σmEtb µt+1 =( σm − 1)Etb πt+1− 1
R−1Et b Rt+1+ R
R−1
b Rt, which together with the money






Et b Rt+1 =( σmµπ − (σm − 1))Etb πt+1 + µyσmEtb yt+1 + µξσmρb ξt.
Now use that the fundamental solution under a money growth policy implies Et b Rt+1 =
δm b Rt +( ( ρ − δm)δRe + δRmδme)b ξt. Thus, the current nominal interest rate is character-














((ρ − δm)δRe + δRmδme)
¶
b ξt.
Further using that Etb πt+1 = δmb πt +( ( ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)b ξt,a n dEtb yt+1 = δmb yt +
((ρ − δm)δye + δymδme)b ξt,w ec a nr e w r i t et h i se x p r e s s i o na s
b Rt =[ σm (µπ − 1) + 1]
R − 1
R − δm











+(σmµπ − (σm − 1))((ρ − δm)δπe + δπmδme)+µyσm ((ρ − δm)δye + δymδme)
)
b ξt.
We further know that there exists a unique value for µ∗
ξ, such that the term in the curly
brackets equals zero if µξ = µ∗
ξ, since all solution coeﬃcients in the curly brackets are
either independent of µξ,s u c ha sδm, δRm, δπm,a n dδπm, or are linear in µ∗
ξ,s u c ha sδme,
δRe, δye,a n dδπe.T h ev a l u eo fµ∗







¢−1 ((ρ − δm)δRe + δRmδme)+σmµy (δemδmy + δey (ρ − δm)) (18)
+( δemδπm + δeπ (ρ − δm))((µπ − 1)σm − 1)].
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This imposes the following restrictions on the partial derivatives ∂ b Rt/∂b πt and ∂ b Rt/∂b yt :




which are satisﬁed by equilibrium sequences implemented by a money growth reaction





















implements a set of equilibrium sequences which are consistent with the plan. ¥
7.3 Proof of proposition 3
From lemma 1 and 2 it follows immediately that a history dependent solution under a
money growth reaction function (11) has to be unstable if ϕ<ϕ ∗. It remains to examine
the stability and uniqueness properties of this solution when ϕ>ϕ ∗. For this we consider
the characteristic polynomial of the model (6)-(8) and (11), which has been derived in the
proof of lemma (1), Q(X)=X3+X2[(R − 1)βσmµy−ω−σβ(1 + R)−σ](βσ)−1+X[ω+
σ(1 + R(1 + β)) + (R − 1)σm(ω − µy − ωµπ)](βσ)−1 − R/β (see 17). The roots X of this
polynomial are functions of the reaction function parameter µπ and µy.T h e v a l u e s f o r
















3), in order to implement the central bank’s plan, and they are functions of the particular
eigenvalue. Eliminating the reaction function parameter with these conditions, we end up
with the following cubic equation for the eigenvalues X:
Q(X)=0⇔ 0=X3 − X2αβ + σωϕ+ σ2ϕ + σ2βϕ+ Rσ2βϕ
ϕσ2β
+X
α + Rαβ + Rσωϕ + ω2 + σ2ϕ + Rσ2ϕ + Rσ2βϕ
ϕσ2β
−
α + ω2 + σ2ϕ
ϕσ2β
R.
It can immediately be seen that Q(0) = − R
σ2βϕ
¡
α + ω2 + σ2ϕ
¢
< −1, implying that the
product of the eigenvalues exceeds one. Hence, there is at least one unstable eigenvalue




σωϕ− α(1 − β) − ω2¢




σ ⇔ Q(1) > 0. Thus, there




σ.I ts a t i s ﬁes X1 ∈ (0,1).W e




[αβ + σϕ(ω + σ (1 − β)+( R − 1)σβ)] < 0.
If the roots X2 and X3 are real, this evidently ensures the existence of exactly one stable
eigenvalue. When the roots X2 and X3 are complex, they can be written as X2,X 3 = h±vi.
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know that h then satisﬁes h =( b − X1)/2.G i v e nt h a tQ00(1) = 6 + 2b<0 ⇔ b<−3,w e
know that h>1 and that X2 and X3 are unstable, if ϕ>ϕ ∗ ⇔ X1 ∈ (0,1). Hence, under
a money growth reaction function (14) there are two unstable and one stable (positive)
eigenvalue if ϕ>ϕ ∗. ¥
7.4 Appendix to the solutions of the central bank’s plan
Forward-looking interest rate policy If the central bank applies an interest rate
reaction function of the form (9), the fundamental solution satisﬁes b xt = x(b ξt). Under
the central bank’s plan the equilibrium can be summarized by a two dimensional system
in inﬂation and output satisfying (6) and (σ − α
σϕ)b yt = σEtb yt+1 + ω
σϕb πt + Etb πt+1.T h e
generic solution for the coeﬃcients derived above, thus reduce to b πt = η1b ξt, b yt = η2b ξt,a n d
b Rt = η3b ξt.T h e s ec o e ﬃcients are given by η1 =( α + σ2ϕ − σ2ρϕ)χz, η2 =( σρϕ− ω)χz,
and η3 =( σω + αρ − σωρ)χz,w h e r ez =[ α−αβρ−σωρϕ+ω2+σ2ϕ(1−ρ−βρ+βρ2)]−1.
Inertial interest rate policy As for the previous regime, it is suﬃcient for our pur-
pose to solve the equilibrium under an inertial interest rate reaction function (10) for the
sequences of inﬂation, output, and the interest rate. In order to be consistent with the
plan these sequences have to satisfy (6), (7), and (13). Eliminating output with the latter,
b yt =
σϕ
α b Rt − ω
αb πt, leads to the following set of equilibrium conditions for inﬂation and the
interest rate






b Rt+1 +( 1− σω/α)Etb πt+1,
(1 + ω2/α)b πt =ω
σϕ
α
b Rt + βEtb πt+1 + χb ξt.
The generic form of the minimum state variable solution for inﬂation and the interest rate
under an inertial interest rate reaction function is given by
b Rt = ρ1 b Rt−1 + ρ2b ξt ,a n d b πt = ρ3 b Rt−1 + ρ4b ξt.
Applying these solutions, leads to the following set of conditions for the undetermined
coeﬃcients
0=σωρ3 − αρ1 + αρ1ρ3 − σωρ1ρ3 − σ2ϕρ1 + σ2ϕρ2
1,
0=σωϕρ1 − αρ3 + αβρ1ρ3 − ω2ρ3,
0=σωρ4 − αρ2 + αρρ4 − σωρρ4 + αρ2ρ3 − σωρ2ρ3 − σ2ϕρ2 + σ2ρϕρ2 + σ2ϕρ1ρ2,
0=αχ − αρ4 + αβρρ4 + σωϕρ2 + αβρ2ρ3 − ω2ρ4.
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σωϕρ1




αβ + σωϕ+ σ2ϕ + σ2βϕ
σ2βϕ
+




One solution is evidently given by ρ1 =0 , which leads to the previous forward-looking
solution. To assess the existence of another solution, let G(ρ1) denote the quadratic
polynomial in the square brackets. Since G(0) = β−1 +( α + ω2)/(ϕβσ2) > 1 and G(1) =
[α(1 − β)+( ω − σϕ)ω]/(ϕβσ2), we can conclude that there exists exactly one stable
and strictly positive root if and only if ϕ>ϕ ∗ (see also proposition 2). The remaining
conditions for the undetermined coeﬃcients imply
ρ2 =α
σω + αρ − σωρ





σω + αρ − σωρ











αβρ − α − ω2
·µ
1 −
σω + αρ − σωρ









where Ξ = σ2ρϕ − σ2ϕ − α + σ2ϕρ1 + σωϕρ1
α − σω
ω2 + α(1 − βρ1)
.
The coeﬃcients for the output solution b yt = ρ5 b Rt−1+ρ6b ξt can easily be derived by applying
b yt =
σϕ
α b Rt − ω














which completes the minimum state variable solution under an inertial interest rate reac-
tion function.
Money growth policy In order to derive the solution under a money growth reaction
function that is consistent with the central bank’s plan, we use the central bank’s ﬁrst
order condition, σϕb Rt = αb yt+ωb πt, and money demand, b Rt = σ(R − 1) b yt−σm (R − 1) b mt,
to summarize the equilibrium by (6), and
Rσb yt =σEtb yt+1 +( R − 1)σm b mt + Etb πt+1,
¡
ϕσ2 (R − 1) − α
¢
b yt =ϕσσm (R − 1) b mt + ωb πt.
The fundamental solution under a money growth reaction function takes the form
b mt = δ1 b mt−1 + δ2b ξt , b πt = δ3 b mt−1 + δ4b ξt,a n d b yt = δ5 b mt−1 + δ6b ξt.
The set of equilibrium conditions in inﬂation, output, and real balances can be reduced,
by eliminating output with b yt = ψ1 b mt + ψ2b πt,w h e r eψ1 =
ϕσσm(R−1)
(ϕσ2(R−1)−α) and ψ2 =
ω
(ϕσ2(R−1)−α). Hence, the equilibrium can be summarized by the following two dimen-
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(1 − ωψ2)b πt =ωψ1 b mt + βb πt+1 + χb ξt,
Rσψ2b πt =σψ1 b mt+1 +( 1+σψ2)b πt+1 +( ( R − 1)σm − Rσψ1) b mt.
Applying the solutions b mt = δ1 b mt−1 + δ2b ξt and b πt = δ3 b mt−1 + δ4b ξt, we end up with the
following set of conditions for the undetermined coeﬃcients
0=βδ1δ3 + ωδ1ψ1 − δ3 (1 − ωψ2),
0=σδ2
1ψ1 − Rσδ3ψ2 + δ1δ3 (σψ2 +1 )+δ1 (σm (R − 1) − Rσψ1),
0=χ + ωδ2ψ1 + β (ρδ4 + δ2δ3) − δ4 (1 − ωψ2),
0=σψ1 (ρδ2 + δ1δ2) − Rσδ4ψ2 +( ρδ4 + δ2δ3)(σψ2 +1 )+δ2 (σm (R − 1) − Rσψ1).
The ﬁrst two conditions can be combined to give δ3 =
ωδ1ψ1
(1−ωψ2)−βδ1 and the following





ψ1 (σ + ω + Rσβ)+βσm (1 − R)
σβψ1
−




Evidently, there is one solution characterized by a zero eigenvalue δ1 =0 .L e tK(δ1) denote
the quadratic polynomial in the square brackets. As K(δ1) is strictly positive at δ1 =0 ,
K(0) = ϕ−1β−1σ−2(α+ω2+σ2ϕ) > 1,a n ds a t i s ﬁes K(1) = ϕ−1β−1σ−2(α−αβ−σωϕ+ω2),
we can conclude that there exists exactly one stable and non-zero root of K(δ1),i fa n d
only if ϕ>ϕ ∗. Thus, when this condition is satisﬁed, the solution with δ1 > 0 is stable
and uniquely determined. Combining the remaining two equations, we end up with the
following conditions for the coeﬃcients δ2 and δ4 :
δ2 =−
χ(ρ(σψ2 +1 )− Rσψ2)
ψ3
,δ 4 =
χ + δ2βδ3 + δ2ωψ1




(σψ1 (ρ + δ1 − R)+σm (R − 1) + δ3 (σψ2 + 1))(1 − ωψ2 − βρ)
+(ρ(σψ2 +1 )− Rσψ2)(βδ3 + ωψ1)
#
.
In order to solve for output we apply b mt = δ1 b mt−1 +δ2b ξt and b πt = δ3 b mt−1 +δ4b ξt, leading
to b yt = δ5 b mt−1 + δ6b ξt,w h e r e
δ5 = δ3ψ2 + δ1ψ1, and δ6 = δ4ψ2 + δ2ψ1.
F i n a l l y ,w es o l v ef o rt h ei n t e r e s tr a t eu s i n gb Rt = σ (R − 1) b yt − σm (R − 1) b mt to give the
solution for the nominal interest rate b Rt = δ7 b mt−1 + δ8b ξt,w h e r e
δ7 =( R − 1)(σδ5 − σmδ1), and δ8 =( R − 1)(σδ6 − σmδ2).
This completes the solution under a money growth reaction function (11) and (14).
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Table A1 Variances for alternative instruments
ρ i.) Forward-looking ii.) Forward-looking iii.) Backward-looking



















0.95 0.012 0.080 0.0057 7.6/104 0.033 2.8/104 6.1/10
4 0.035 3.3/104
0.9 0.069 0.15 0.025 0.0010 0.028 4.5/104 9.9/10
4 0.029 5.1/104
0.8 0.53 0.23 0.15 0.0021 0.022 8.6/104 0.0022 0.023 9.6/104
0.7 0.046 0.0046 0.012 0.0037 0.020 0.0014 0.0041 0.021 0.0016
0.6 0.019 3.2/104 0.0046 0.0063 0.020 0.0023 0.0069 0.021 0.0025
0.5 0.011 0.21/105 0.0025 0.011 0.022 0.0037 0.012 0.023 0.0040
0.4 0.0071 3.1/105 0.0016 0.019 0.028 0.0063 0.021 0.030 0.0068
Note: The eigenvalue under ii.) and iii.) equals 0.83 and # indicates indeterminacy.
Table A2 Welfare losses L/varξ f o ras m a l l e rv e l o c i t y( ν =0 .44)
ρ i.) Forward-looking ii.) Backward-looking iii.) Forward-looking
Interest rate policy Interest rate policy# Money growth policy
0.95 0.0037 0.0018 0.0021
0.9 0.0096 0.0017 0.0021
0.8 0.16 0.0018 0.0028
0.7 0.25 0.0025 0.0043
0.6 0.035 0.0039 0.0067
0.5 0.015 0.0064 0.011
0.4 0.0089 0.011 0.019
Note: The eigenvalue under ii.) and iii.) equals 0.75 and # indicates indeterminacy.
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